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assessing the exact nature of the records 42 and prevent an agency from escaping the law by "padding" its records with protected information.
The use of partial disclosure should also be expressly allowed. If a
few sensitive items in the record would prevent the opening of an otherwise accessible document, it would seem that the idea of public disclosure
would best be served by allowing the reviewing court to strike the objectionable parts and permit the rest to be opened. Again, while this
might be possible under the present statute, 43 it is not clear, and specific
legislation on the point would be useful.
The problem of whether a record should be opened after action on
it is completed, which took up much space in the Wilson decision, would
be alleviated as well with the use of a balancing test. Instead of trying to
set absolute rules as to when such records were to be opened, -a court
would merely consider them as it would other protected records and look
to the interests involved to see if opening was appropriate.
LYNN

G. CAREY

EFFECT OF CREDITOR MISBEHAVIOR ON RIGHT
TO DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERICAL CODE
Gateway Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co.1
Gateway Aviation (Gateway) procured a Cessna airplane from the defendant, 2 Automatic Equipment Leasing Corporation (Automatic), through
a secured sale. Gateway intended to use the plane in an air taxi service
and was to pay for it in ninety-six monthly installments. Shortly after
purchasing the aircraft, however, Gateway defaulted on its contract and
Automatic repossessed. 3 After sending notice to Gateway, Automatic of-

42. In camera inspection has been adopted elsewhere judicially for similar
reasons. See, e.g., Lodge v. Knowlton, 118 N.H. 574, 391 A.2d 893 (1978).
43. Several federal cases have adopted such techniques to excise exempted
material from a mass of unprotected material. See, e.g., Grumman Aircraft Eng'r
Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 580-81 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Sterling Drug,
Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 704 (D.C.Cir. 1971).
1. 577 S.W.2d 860 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1978).
2. Although Cessna Aircraft Company was the named defendant, the plaintiffs dismissed as to them, leaving Automatic as the sole party defendant. Id. at 861.
3. Gateway made 10 monthly installments during which time the airplane
required frequent repairs. Although by their agreement Gateway was obligated
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

1

19801

Missouri Law
Review, Vol.
45, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 14
RECENT
CASES

fered the plane for sale at a public auction, but refused to accept the
highest bid of $130,000. Two months later, without giving further notice
to Gateway, Automatic sold the airplane for $134,000 at a private sale.
Gateway subsequently sued Automatic for tortious conversion 4 and
the defendant counterclaimed for a deficiency of nearly $98,000, the difference between the debt owed under the sales contract and the amount
received for the collateral at the default sale. The trial court found for
Automatic on both claims and the plaintiff appealed. The court of appeals
upheld the lower court's finding that the repossession of the airplane
had not been a tortious conversion since Automatic had the right to take
5
possession of the collateral after Gateway repudiated its agreement.L
However, the appellate court held that awarding a deficiency judgment
to Automatic was improper because Gateway had not been given notice
of the private sale. The court concluded that a secured party's failure
to comply strictly with the default provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code precludes the creditor from recovering a deficiency judgment. 6
Determining whether a secured creditor is entitled to a deficiency
judgment when he has failed to comply with the default provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code 7 has been the subject of considerable controversy in recent years. 8 Section 9-504 (3) of the Code controls a secured

to make repairs, it defaulted on two payments and warned that no payments
would be made unless the problems with the airplane were resolved. Automatic

responded by threatening to repossess. Plaintiffs then tendered the two missed
payments. Defendant refused to accept, demanding instead full payment of all
installments. Such payment was not forthcoming and defendant repossessed the

collateral. In violation of the agreements, Gateway had permitted the federal

license for operating the plane to lapse and had not paid the insurance premiums.
Also, the airplane had not been maintained in a condition to be operated for
air taxi service. Id.
4. Also suing as plaintiffs were Paul and Ellen Silverstein, guarantors for
Gateway's purchase of the airplane. One question addressed by several courts
outside of Missouri is whether guarantors are "debtors" for purposes of § 9-504 (3).
Most courts have answered in the affirmative and have held that notice to the
guarantors is necessary to comply with § 9-504 (3). See, e.g., Hepworth v. Orlando
Bank & Trust Co., 323 So. 2d 41 (Fla. App. 1975); T &=W Ice Cream, Inc. v.
Carriage Barn, Inc., 107 N.J. Super. 328, 258 A.2d 162 (1969). Contra, Brinson
v. Commercial Bank, 138 Ga. App. 177, 225 S.E.2d 701 (1976).
5. The court also noted that Gateway had improperly repudiated its agreements with defendant and was thus in default under the terms of the contract.
577 S.W.2d at 861.
6. Id. at 863. The court noted that the debtor had lost his right to redeem
the airplane and to secure purchasers because he had not been given the required
notice. Id. at 862. The court also noted that deficiency judgments were not
allowed at common law and therefore should be allowed only after strict compliance with the relevant statutes. Id. at 863.
7. The various forms of creditor misbehavior are discussed in text ac,
companying notes 9-12 infra.
8. Henszey, A Secured Creditor's Right to Collect a Deficiency Judgment
under UCC Section 9-504: A Need to Remedy the Impasse, 31 Bus. LAw. 2025
(1976).
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party's disposal of collateral after default and requires that every aspect
of the disposition be commercially reasonable. 10 This subsection requires
that the secured party give the debtor reasonable notice of the time and
place of any public sale or of the time after which a private sale is to
occur."1 It also prohibits the secured party from purchasing the collateral
2
at a private sale except in certain limited circumstances.'
Courts are often confronted with the problems created by the failure
of the secured party to dispose of the collateral in accordance with the requirements of section 9-504 (3).13 Section 9-507 (1) of the Code allows the
debtor to recover any loss resulting from the secured party's noncompliance
with the provisions of part 5 of Article 9 if disposition has already occurred.' 4 However, this remedy alone generally has not been thought to
9. RSMo § 400.9-504 (3) (1978) (U.C.C.) provides in material part that:
Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value
or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or reasonable notification
of the time after which any private sale or other intended disposition
is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor, and except in the case of consumer goods to any other person who has a security interest in the collateral and who has duly filed a financing state-

ment indexed in the name of the debtor in this state or who is known

by the secured party to have a security interest in the collateral. The secured party may buy at any public sale and if the collateral is of a type
customarily sold in a recognized market or is of a type which is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations he may buy at private
sale.
The Missouri statute is identical to U.C.C. § 9-504 (3). Hereinafter, citations will
be made only to the 1962 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code.
10. The issue of what is commercially reasonable arises with some regularity.
For a discussion of this question, see Burke, Secured Transactions, 32 Bus. LAW.
1133, 1161-62 (1977); Siegel, The Commercially Reasonable Disposition of Collateral, 80 CoM. L.J. 67, 70-71, 81 (1975); Comment, Secured Transactions: Commercial Reasonability of Secured Party's Sale of Collateral After Default Under
§ 9-504(3), 29 OKrA. L. R.v. 486, 497-505 (1976).

11. U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
12. Id.
13. The courts do not explicitly distinguish the various forms of creditor
misbehavior in considering whether a deficiency judgment should be allowed.
See, e.g., Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1972);
Jacksoh State Bank v. Beck, 577 P.2d 168 (Wyo. 1978). See also P. COOGAN, W. HoGAN & D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACrIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 8.06[2J (1975); J. WHITE & R. SuMMmEPS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1000
(1972). However, the court in Gateway suggests that different rules should apply for different infractions. This argument is considered more fully in text accompanying notes 23-28 infra.
14. U.C.C. § 9-507 (1) provides:
If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance
with the provisions of . . . Part [5] disposition may be ordered or re-

strained on appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposition has oc-

curred the debtor or any person entitled to notification or whose security
interest has been made known to the secured party prior to the disposition has a right to recover from the secured party any loss caused by a
failure to comply with the provisions of this Part. If the collateral is

consumer goods, the debtor has a right to recover in any event an amount
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1980
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provide adequate protection for the debtor because it places the difficult
burden of proving damages on the debtor.15 Very few jurisdictions limit
the debtor to this remedy. 16 Instead, the courts have tended to adopt
one of two positions in an attempt to provide the debtor with an adequate
remedy.
Several jurisdictions have totally barred the right to a deficiency
17
judgment when there has been some form of creditor misbehavior.
These courts have held that compliance with the Code is a condition
precedent to the award of a deficiency.' 8 Other jurisdictions have merely
not less than the credit service charge plus ten per cent of the principal
amount of the debt or the time price differential plus ten per cent of
the cash price.
15. Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 149, 398 S.W.2d
538, 542 (1966). See also White, Representing the Low-Income Consumer in Repossessions, Resales, and Deficiency Judgment Cases, 3 U.C.C. L.J. 199, 218 (197071); Note, Remedies for Failure to Notify Debtor of Disposition of Repossessed
Collateral Under the UCC, 44 CoLo. L. Rav. 221, 227 (1972).
16. The following cases have restricted the debtor to this remedy: Barbour
v. United States, 562 F.2d 19 (10th Cir. 1977); Abbott Motors, Inc. v. Ralston,
28 Mass. App. Dec. 35 (1964); Leasco Computer, Inc. v. Sheridan Indus., Inc.,
82 Misc. 2d 897, 371 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1975); Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Hurst, 570
P.2d 1031 (Utah 1977); Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866,
496 P.2d 966 (1972).
17. In re Hardie, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 633 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Dynalectron Corp.
v. Jack Richards Aircraft Co., 337 F. Supp. 659 (W.D. Okla. 1972); Skeels v.
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963), rev'd on other
grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964); Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d
999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1972); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lloyd, 12 U.C.C. Rep.
15 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973); Barnett v. Barnett Bank, 345 So. 2d 804 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977); Gurwitch v. Luxurest Furniture Mfg. Co., 233 Ga. 934, 214 S.E.2d
373 (1975); Herman Ford-Mercury, Inc. v. Betts, 251 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1977);
Camden Nat'l Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 829 (Me. 1973); One Twenty Credit
Union v. Darcy, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 792 (Mass. App. Div. 1968); Cities Serv. Oil Co.
v. Ferris, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 899 (Mich. Dist. Ct. 1971); First Nat'l Bank v. Rose,
249 N.W.2d 723 (Neb. 1977); Marine Midland Bank-Central v. Watkins, 89
Misc. 2d 949, 392 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1977); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Burns, 562 P.2d
233 (Utah 1977); Jackson State Bank v. Beck, 577 P.2d 168 (Wyo. 1978).
18. The courts have justified the denial of a deficiency on the following
grounds: (1) in lack of notice cases the debtor has been deprived of his right to
redeem the collateral under § 9-506, Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d
999, 1007, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315, 320 (1972); Braswell v. American Nat'l Bank, 117
Ga. App. 699, 701, 161 S.E.2d 420, 422 (1968); (2) in lack of notice cases the
debtor has lost his opportunity to protect his interests by securing purchasers
or by being present at the sale, Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F.
Supp. 696, 707 (W.D. Pa. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir.
1964); Gateway Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 577 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1978); (3) nothing in the language of § 9-507 suggests that it
shall be the debtor's exclusive remedy, Camden Nat'l Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d
329, 332 (Me. 1973); (4) under pre-Code commercial law, most courts denied
a deficiency, C.I.T. Corp. v. Haynes, 161 Me. 353, 358, 212 A.2d 436, 439 (1965);
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 1090,
323 N.Y.S.2d 13, 15 (1971); (5) since the Code alters the common law regarding
deficiency judgments after repossession, any right to a deficiency accrues only
after strict compliance with the relevant statutes, Turk v. St. Petersburg Bank
& Trust Co., 281 So. 2d 534, 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Gateway Aviation,
Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 577 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1978); (6)
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qualified the secured party's right to a deficiency1 9 and have held that
section 9-507 (1) raises a rebuttable presumption 20 that the value of the
collateral is at least equal to the amount of the debt. 21 Hence, for the

secured party to collect a deficiency judgment he must prove that the
amount that reasonably could have been obtained at a proper sale was
22
less than the outstanding debt.

while § 9-507 provides an affirmative cause of action to recover a loss already
sustained, it was not intended as a substitute for a defense to a deficiency, action,
Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1007, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315, 320
(1972); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 1089, 1092,
323 N.Y.S.2d 13, 16 (1971); and (7) barring a deficiency acts as a deterrent to
creditor misbehavior, Lakin, Default Proceedings Under Article 9: Problems,
Solutions, and Lessons To Be Learned, 8 AKRON L. REv. 1, 30 (1974); Comment,
The Right to an Article 9 Deficiency Judgment Without 9-504 Notice of Resale,
7 VAL. U.L. Rav. 465, 471 (1973).
19. United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1974);
Rushton v. Shea, 423 F. Supp. 468 (D. Del. 1976); In re U.G.M. Corp., 20 U.C.C.
Rep. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1976); In re Thomas, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 578 (W.D. Va. 1973);
Kobuk Eng'r &-Contracting Servs., Inc. v. Superior Tank & Constr. Co., 568 P.2d
1007 (Alas. 1977); Universal C.I.T. Credit Co. v. Rone, 248 Ark. 665, 453 S.W.2d
37 (1970); Community Management Assoc. v. Tousley, 32 Colo. App. 33, 505 -P.2d
1314 (1973); Savings Bank v. Booze, 34 Conn. Supp. 632, 382 A.2d 226 (1977);
Associates Financial Servs., Co. v. DiMarco, 383 A.2d 296 (Del. Super.' 1978);
Commercial Discount Corp. v. Bayer, 57 Ill. App. 3d 295, 372 N.E.2d 926
(1978); Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 370 N.E.2d 918 (Ind. App. 1977);
Walker v. V. M. Box Motor Co., 325 So. 2d 905 (Miss. 1976); Levers v. Rio
King Land & Inv. Co., 560 P.2d 917 (Nev. 1977); Franklin State Bank v. Parker,
136 N.J. Super. 476, 346 A42d 632 (1975); Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands
Forest Prods., Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 535 P.2d 1077 (1975); Security Trust Co. v.
Thomas, 59 App. Div. 2d 242, 399 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1975); Hodges v. Nortoh, 29
N.C.'App. 193, 223 S.E.2d 848 (1976); Investors Acceptance Co. v. James "ralcott,
Inc., 454 S.W.2d 130 (Tenn. App. 1969).
20. Some cases have held that the presumption arises only after creditor
misbehavior. Barker v. Horn, 245 Ark. 315, 432 S.W.2d 21 (1968); Franklin
State Bank v. Parker, 136 N.J. Super. 476, 346 A.2d 632 (1975). Other cases
have held that the presumption arises anytime the value of the collateral is at
issue in a deficiency action. But if the sale is conducted in accordance with
§ 9-504 (3), the sum received is evidence of the collateral's value. Universal "C.I.T.
Credit Co. v. Rone, 453 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Ark. 1970); Clark Leasing Corp. v. White
Sands Forest Prods., Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 455, 535 P.2d 1077, 1081 (1975). This seems
only a semantic difference; the results of the cases are the same.
21. The justifications commonly advanced in support of this position
include: (1) the secured party's disposal of the collateral makes it difficult for
the debtor to prove his loss with reasonable certainty if he is limited to his
remedy under § 9-507 (1), Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143,
149-50, 398 S.W,2d 538, 542 (1966); (2) the U.C.C. has already provided the
debtor with a remedy in § 9-507, Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 370 N.E.2d
918, 927 (Ind. App. 1977); Wirth v. Heavey, 508 S.W.2d 263, 268 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1974); (3) denying a deficiency contravenes the spirit of the U.C.C. 'which
disfavors penal damages and emphasizes fluid guidelines over rigid rules of law,
Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 370 N.E.2d 918, 927 (Ind. App. 1977); (4) a
more just solution is obtained, Savings Bank v. Booze, 382 A.2d 226, 228 (Conn.
Supp. 1977); Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Prods., Inc., 87 N.M. 451,
455, 535 P.2d 1077, 1081 (1975); and (5) the presumption position is more consonant with the Code's spirit of commercial reasonableness, Conti Causeway
Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super 382, 386, 276 A.2d 402, 404-05 (1971). ,
22. This position will hereinafter be referred to as the presumption position.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1980
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Prior to Gateway only one other Missouri case, Wirth v. Heavey.,23
had dealt with the question of whether to grant a deficiency when there had
been some form of creditor misbehavior under section 9-504 (3). In Wirth,
the Court of Appeals, Kansas City District, adopted the presumption
position. 24 The St. Louis District of the Court of Appeals summarily distinguished Gateway from Wirth, however, on the ground that different
forms of creditor misbehavior were involved. Wirth was concerned with
the purchase of the collateral by a secured party at his own private sale,
whereas Gateway involved the secured party's failure to give notice of a
private sale to the debtor. The decision of the St. Louis appellate court
thus suggests that a deficiency judgment should be denied when the
creditor fails to give notice of a default sale to the debtor, but should be
granted when the secured party buys at a private sale if he meets the
25
requisite burden of proof with respect to the value of the collateral.
Although lack of notice cases are distinguishable from cases involving
other forms of creditor misconduct, 26 denying a deficiency judgment only
23. 508 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974). See also Note, 40 Mo. L. Rv.
169 (1975). In this case plaintiffs sold their interest in a root beer drive-in to their
partners, the defendants, in exchange for a promissory note for $4,000 and a
security agreement covering the business equipment. Defendants defaulted and
plaintiffs repossessed the restaurant equipment. After advertising the sale and
receiving high bids of $350 for two refrigerated root beer barrels and $500 for
all the equipment, plaintiffs purchased all of the items for $650 and then resold
the two refrigerated root beer barrels for $350. The trial court held that the disposition was reasonable and awarded plaintiffs a deficiency judgment. The court
of appeals found that there was not a widespread market for this kind
of used restaurant equipment and that there were no standard price quotations.
Accordingly, plaintiffs had not complied with § 9-504 (3) when they purchased
at their own private sale. However, the court of appeals adopted the presumption
position and held that the trial court could have properly determined that the
price obtained was the reasonable value of the collateral.
24. The court stated that denying the deficiency judgment did not suit the
circumstances of the case and that adopting the presumption position appeared
to be a more just remedy for creditor misbehavior. 508 S.W.2d at 268.
25. The court gave no indication what result should obtain when the creditor
misbehavior involves a commercially unreasonable disposition. To the extent that
a distinction is justified, a commercially unreasonable disposition probably
should be grouped with a creditor buying at his own private sale in violation
of § 9-504 (3) because both forms of creditor misbehavior can be distinguished from
lack of notice cases. It is only in failure to give notice cases that the debtor has
lost his right to redeem and the opportunity to find purchasers for the collateral.
26. It is only in lack of notice cases that the debtor loses his § 9-506 right
of redemption and is deprived of the opportunity to protect his interests by finding potential buyers and by being present at a public sale. However, several commentators have argued that the right to redeem is usually not a viable alternative.
See II G. GILmORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.2, at 1216
(1965); Minetz, May a "Wrongdoer" Recover a Deficiency Judgment, or Is Section
9-507(1) a Debtor's Exclusive Remedy?, 6 U.C.C. L.J. 344, 362 (1973-74); Note,
A Creditor's Right To a Deficiency Judgment Under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: Effect of Lack of Notice, 42 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 56, 78 (1975-76).
It has also been suggested that some debtors would have little ability to protect
their interests even if they had notice of the sale because they are unfamiliar with
the standards of commercial reasonableness to which the secured party can be
held. See P. CooGAN, W. HOGAN & D. VAcTs, supra note 13.
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when, notice is not given to the debtor ignores the fact that a debtor will
often suffer just as great a loss when the sale price is deflated because the
secured party buys at a private sale or some aspect of the disposition is
commercially unreasonable. Gateway appears to be the first decision to rely
27
on this distinction in determining the secured party's right to a deficiency.
Since all of the acts prescribed by section 9-504 are grouped together within
a single subsection, the courts have not previously differentiated between
the types of creditor misbehavior either in denying or awarding a deficiency judgment, nor have most commentators made any distinction between types of creditor misbehavior and the awarding of deficiency
28
judgments.
In denying Automatic a deficiency, the Gateway court also placed
some weight for its decision on Anheuser v. Oswald Refractories Co, 29
a case involving the interpretation of section 2-706.30 This section provides that an aggrieved seller may, when the buyer wrongfully rejects or
revokes acceptance of contracted goods, recover the difference between
the subsequent resale price and the original contract price. 31 Anheuser
held that before a seller may avail himself of this remedy, he must comply
with all the terms of that section. 32 By analogy, if the seller loses his
remedy for misbehavior under section 2-706, the secured party could
lose his remedy for misbehavior under section 9-504.
Section 2-706 (1) explicitly requires that the resale be conducted in
good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner as a condition pre27. One student writer has interpreted the Tennessee cases as making a
similar distinction but reaching opposite results. The Tennessee courts appar-

ently deny a deficiency when the sale is not commercially reasonable, but not when

there is a lack of notice. Note, Uniform Commercial Code-Deficiency Creditor
Who Fails To Give Notice of Resale Has Increased Burden of Proof, 22 KAN. L.
REv. 297, 308 n.78 (1974).
A different distinction, barring a deficiency judgment in retail transactions
when there is creditor misbehavior but not in commercial transactions, was rejected by the Georgia Supreme Court in Gurwitch v. Luxurest Furniture Mfg.
Co., 233 Ga. 934, 214 S.E.2d 373 (1975).
28. See P. COOGAN, W. HoAN & D. VAGTS, supra note 13; J. WHiTE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 13, at 1000; HENSZEY, supra note 8.
29. 541 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976).
30. The pertinent portions of § 2-706 are subsections (1) and (3) which
state:
(1) Under the conditions stated in Section 2-703 on seller's remedies, the
seller may resell the goods concerned or the undelivered balance thereof.
Where the resale is made in good faith and in a commercially reasonable
manner the seller may recover the difference between the resale price
and the contract price together with any incidental damages allowed under
the provisions of this Article (Section 2-710), but less expenses saved in
consequence of the buyer's breach.
(3) Where the resale is at private sale the seller must give the buyer

reasonable notification of his intention to resell.
31. U.C.C. § 2-706 (1).
32. 541 S.W.2d at 711.
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33
cedent to the recovery of a deficiency. This weakens any analogy with
section 9-504 since it has no such explicit language.3 4 Further, the comments to section 2-706 state that "[f]ailure to act properly under this
section deprives the seller of the measure of damages here provided-and
35
relegates him to that provided in section 2-708." In other words, the misbehaving seller is not without a remedy; he is simply prevented from
using the resale price to measure his damages. He may still recover damages
equal to the "difference between the market price at the time and place
for tender and the unpaid contract price."3 6 Thus, the court's reliance on
Anheuser, in concluding that under section 9-504 the misbehaving creditor
37
should be totally without a remedy, seems misplaced.
Several commentators and at least one court have urged an amendment to Article 9 as the best way to settle the issue of whether to grant
a deficiency judgment following creditor misbehavior. 38 An amendment
by the U.C.C. Editorial Board clarifying the debtor's proper remedy
39
would make Article 9 more uniform, a stated purpose of the Code.
Also, the continuing split among the courts in this area suggests! that
possibly neither of the remedies discussed above adequately protects the
debtor. Amending Article 9 would give policy makers an opportunity to
develop a new and more sufficient resolution of the problem.

33. Section 2-706 does not explicitly make notification of the sale a condition precedent. However, Portal Galleries, Inc. v. Tomar Prods., Inc., 60 Misc.
2d 523, 302 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1969), the only case cited as authority for the Anheuser
holding that notice is a condition precedent to a recovery under § 2-706 (1), cites
§ 2-706 (1) for the proposition that notice is necessary to recover damages. Id. at
525, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 873. Thus, Portal suggests that notice is an aspect of a commercially reasonable sale. Even without this analysis, it would seem much easier
to find notice as a condition precedent from a statute such as § 2-706 (1), which
has the condition precedent of commercial reasonableness, than from § 9-504
which has no such language.
34. Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 370 N.E.2d 918, 926 (Ind. App. 1977),
in adopting the presumption position, contrasted § 9-504 where there is no
language barring a deficiency with § 2-706 which strongly implies that notice is
a condition precedent to a recovery.
35. U.C.C. § 2-706, comment 2. See also Cole v. Melvin, 441 F. Supp. 193,
205 (D.S.D. 1977); Wolpert v. Foster, 254 N.W.2d 348, 351 (Minn. 1977).
36. U.C.C. § 2-708 (1).
37. It has been suggested that since Article 2 allows the second remedy
under § 2-706 even when the resale involves misbehavior on the seller's part, an
argument can be made in favor of not barring outright a deficiency when there
is creditor misbehavior under § 9-504. Comment, The Right to an Article 9
Deficiency Judgment Without 9-504 Notice of Resale, 7 VAL. U.L. REv. 465, 478
(1973).
38. See Security Trust Co. v. Thomas, 59 App. Div. 2d 242, 245, 399 N.Y.S.2d
51.1, 513 (1977); Henszey, A Secured Creditor's Right to Collect a Deficiency
Judgment under UCC Section 9-504: A Need to Remedy the Impasse, 31 Bus. LAw.
2025, 2035 (1976); Minetz, May a "Wrongdoer" Recover a Deficiency Judgment or
Is Section 9-507(1) a Debtor'sExclusive Remedy?, 6 U.C.C. L.J. 344, 361 (1973-74).

39. U.C.C. § 1-102 (2). One commentator has suggested that the U.C.C.
Editorial Board may decide uniformity is not important in the granting of deficiency judgments after creditor misbehavior. Davenport, Default, Enforcement
and Remedies Under Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 7 VAL.

U.L. REv. 265, 302 (1973).
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The debtor-creditor relationship is one in which there is often a
great disparity in the ability of each party to protect his interests. Because in most cases the creditor will have greater leverage than the debtor,
some deterrent is necessary to prevent overreaching by the creditor. Neither
of the present positions adopted by the courts adequately meets this need.
Although the presumption position purports to penalize creditors, it
actually acts as a deterrent only when the creditor does not meet his burden
of proof and when the value of the collateral is less than the outstanding
debt. Two factors prevent this placing of the burden of proof on the
secured party from serving as a sufficient deterrent in Missouri. First,
Wirth requires the secured party to meet only a nominal burden of
proof in order to recover a deficiency. 40 Second, a misbehaving creditor
who buys at his own sale for less than a reasonable value can protect
himself by documenting evidence as to the collateral's fair market value.
Consequently, in cases where the collateral is worth less than the outstanding debt, he will be able to prove this and still recover a deficiency
judgment. While this deficiency will not include the amount less than
the reasonable value that the creditor could have collected if the debtor
had not challenged his purchase, it will include the amount of the
outstanding debt above the reasonable value of the collateral which is
all the creditor would have collected if he had not misbehaved. In such
a case the misbehaving creditor is not penalized and there is no deterrent
effect. Conversely, the anti-deficiency position is unpalatable to many
courts because it often exacts too high a penalty.41 This is especially true
in those situations where the deficiency is quite large, the secured party's
misbehavior was unintentional, or the debtor was not really harmed by it.
What is needed is a middle ground where there is some penalty on
the misbehaving creditor to act as a deterrent but where there is also
some mechanism to ameliorate the harshness of the penalty. Possible ways
to accomplish this include allowing the debtor to collect attorney fees
from the misbehaving creditor 4 2 or providing for a maximum amount or
40. The only evidence plaintiffs offered as to the value of the collateral was
their statement that they valued it at $650. The court of appeals stated that
this evidence was sufficient for the trial court to determine that the price obtained at the sale was reasonable in light of the facts that much of the equipment
was purchased for $1000 and that the $4000 note was given by the debtor in part
for the sale of an ongoing business. Wirth v. Heavey, 508 S.W.2d 263, 269 (Mo.
App., D.K.C. 1974). The low standard of proof required in Wirth has been
cnticized in P. COOGAN, W. HoGAN S&
D. VAGTS, supra note 13, at 934 n.71.3.
41. See Associates Financial Servs. Co. v. DiMarco, 583 A.2d 296, 302
el. Super. 1978); Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 370 N.E.2d 918, 927 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1977).
42. This remedy also would compensate the debtor more fully than the
presumption position does when there has been creditor misbehavior and the secured party meets his burden of proof. In such a case the creditor is limited to a
deficiency judgment for the amount of the outstanding debt that is greater than
the reasonable value of the collateral as proved by the secured party. This limitation, in theory, fully compensates the debtor for the value of the collateral. In
fact, the debtor is not fully compensated because he is still out his attorney's fees
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